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Carl von Clausewitz (1780 –1831) stands out from other writers of military classics 
because rather than looking at war as purely a matter of mathematical theory of probability and 
calculation, he instead examines it critically seeing war also as a political instrument.  To do this 
he, broke war down into its fundamental parts and recognized them all as necessary aspects to 
his theory.  This is unlike many other military theorists such as Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-
1869) who placed no emphasis on political goals.  Clausewitz’s work was highly influenced by 
the Enlightenment and sought to examine warfare as a rational tool for political policy.  
Concerned with the political and military aspect, like Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
Clausewitz was addressing the concept of war as pertaining to a nation state or a political entity.  
Because of his grounding in Enlightenment values, Clausewitz examines war as a rational option 
in politics and not just a random act of human emotion.  Thus his On War, though written in the 
early nineteenth century, continues to influence political and military leaders today because it 
remains an applicable study of the application of force between political entities, taking into 
account not just mathematical studies, but elements of human nature and the primacy of aligning 
political and military goals in war. 
II 
 Secondary sources not only help in the understanding of the primary source material but 
also demonstrate how the topic has been treated by other historians, going so far as allowing a 
researcher to see how views on the topic may have changed over the years.  Clausewitz’s On 
War: A Biography1, Clausewitz: A Biogrphay2, and Clausewitz and the State3, are quite 
                                                 
1 Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007). 
2 Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1971). 
3 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
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obviously most interested in the life and development of Carl von Clausewitz.  These three 
books contain their own analysis of his best known work On War but also use many of his other 
works and letters to his wife and friends to develop not only his theories but him as a person as 
well.  The development of Clausewitz and his theories are closely tied in Parkinson’s 
Clausewitz: A Biography and Paret’s Clausewitz and the State.  Both of these focus on the man 
and the specific events and trials that lead him to the theories of politics and war he is now best 
known for.  Hew Strachan takes Clausewitz’s on War: A Biography in a slightly different 
direction.  Strachan first details Clausewitz’s development then transitions into a discussion and 
analysis of his work. 
 Paret and Parkinson do disagree on some aspects of Clausewitz’s life.  The discrepancy 
between them is only on the matter of the Clausewitz family’s ties to nobility and the reason for 
the discharge of Clausewitz’s father.  Despite this these biographies confirm some other much 
more important factors in his life.  They give valuable insight into the education that Clausewitz 
received early in his military career as well as demonstrating his military background.  The other 
important aspect that they agree on are his mentors and the authors that he had read, building a 
strong argument basing his education heavily in Enlightenment. 
 The other four monographs whose subject is Clausewitz, while having biographical 
sections, focus on the political or military implications of his theory on the world.  Philosophers 
of Peace and War by W. B. Gallie4 and The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and 
Orders by Richard Ned Lebow5 place On War, in a social context.  While Clausewitz and his 
                                                 
4 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
 
5 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
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theory of war and politics are examined by both of these books his work is not their focus, rather 
it is part of their examination of historical political influences. 
 Philosophers of Peace and War is an examination five authors who wrote on peace and 
war that Gallie felt had the longest lasting impact on our modern perceptions of these two 
subjects.  His desire was to create interest in knowledge of works of Kant, Clausewitz, Marx and 
Engle, and Tolstoy in the hope that students would delve back into these authors.  Gallie openly 
admits to seeking only the “meta-narrative” of these works.  Philosopheres of Peace and War is a 
very short book and only give a brief overview and look at any of these authors.  This is however 
Gallie’s primary goal.  He only wished to give a bit of what each author was about and for this 
analysis and comparison to examine their overarching views on peace and or war.  Gallie found 
that Clausewitz had removed himself from the more traditional analytical scope of the military, 
one that focuses on the technical aspects, and tackled it from a societal standpoint. 
 Lebow in Tragic Vision of Politics is using Clausewitz as part of an examination of the 
Cold War world.  He uses writers who have influence the western views of politics and war as a 
means by which to base interaction between states and the direction of politics following the 
Second World War.  What Lebow is writing specifically to is American hegemony and its 
imperialistic drives.  He cautions draws interpretations form different time periods but the lesson 
he seeks to impress upon his readers form Clausewitz is the folly of allowing there to become a 
gulf between political and military policy. 
 The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and 
Their Impact on the German Conduct in the Two World Wars by Jehuda L. Wallach6 and On 
                                                 
6 Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen 
and Their Impact on the German Conduct of the Two World Wars (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
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Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas by Hugh Smith7 are more militarily oriented 
works.  As a result both these monographs focus much more on Carl von Clausewitz than the 
previous two discussed.  Wallach as most would suspect when studying Clausewitz is looking to 
establish relations between the military and politics.  He is however looking specifically at the 
effects that Clausewitz’s ideas had on the German State in both World Wars.  On the other hand 
Hugh Smith systematically breaks down the development and concept of Clauswitzian theory in 
an effort to establish the viability of On War into the present day.  Both men arrive at the 
conclusion, much like Lebow and Gallie, which is that Clausewitz is more often then naught 
misinterpreted by his readers as they look at only On War and none of his other works which 
would aid in an interpretation of his theories.  Wallach concludes that the Germans 
misinterpreted Clausewitz’s theories and it was Schlieffen’s ideas that predominantly shape the 
German war machine from 1914 to 1945.  Smith’s conclusion is that in present times 
Clausewitz’s warning of maintaining the political object as the military object is more important 
than ever. 
 All four of these sources use both secondary and primary sources.  Again, they all claim 
that the best way to interpret Clausewitzian theory is by having his other works and letters 
available.  Unfortunately they are relatively inaccessible as many continue to be only in the 
original German.  They share many secondary sources, of which Clausewitz and the State stands 
out as a cornerstone in background on Clausewitz.  What can be learned from all of these sources 
is that there is a general consensus among English speaking scholars that earlier interpretations 
of On War, largely in French, do not utilize many of the other texts written by Clausewitz to aid 
                                                 





in the interpretation.  Additionally these sources help to identify the intellectual background for 
Clausewitz’s work On War. 
III 
To better understand his thoughts it is necessary to look at Carl von Clausewitz’s early 
history and not just the time period in which he lived.  Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780.  His 
father, Friedrich Gabriel, began the tradition of military service in the Clausewitz family.  His 
suffered from having only tenuous claims to nobility as the von had been dropped by distant 
ancestors who wanted to enter into the clergy and teaching professions.  However, when he 
entered the service, Friedrich began to use von once again.  He served in the Seven Years’ War 
as a Lieutenant in the Prussian Army.  He was discharged due to an injury that crippled his right 
hand and he was given a civilian post of Royal tax collector in the town of Burg.  Due to his 
father’s military ties Clausewitz from a very early age was exposed to military affairs.  Where 
his ancestors had pursued academic vocations and enjoyed a great deal of education, 
Clausewitz’s education at the local school was meager.  Friedrich enjoyed the company of 
soldiers and was often visited by his old comrades many of whom were still in the service of the 
Prussian Army.   Clausewitz enlisted into the Prussian Army, following the path of his older 
brothers took, at the age of twelve.  Because of his ties to nobility, no matter how feeble, 
Clausewitz was accepted into the service as a Fahnenjunker8, a flag officer, a position presented 
to anyone qualified and belonging to any noble family. 
 War opened the same year of his enlisting between France and Prussia as the French 
Revolution threatened to spill across the Rhine.  After only a few months Clausewitz was 
promoted to Ensign, a full officer, and by the age of fifteen he was promoted to Second-
                                                 
8 A Fahnenjunker is a cadet or officer-candidate the rank of which is equivalent to a corporal the lowest 
non-commissioned officer rank and who was responsible for bearing the regimental colors while on the march. 
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Lieutenant while serving in Prussia’s Rhine Campaigns against the French during their 
revolution.  He had received his second promotion by the time King Friedrich Wilhem signed the 
Peace of Basle with France.  Following his enrollment at the Military Academy in Berlin 
Clausewitz was assigned to Prince August, son of crown Prince Ferdinand heir to King Friedrich, 
as his adjutant.  Shortly thereafter, in 1806, Prussia was at war again with the French, this time as 
Napoleon sought to bring the French Revolution to the rest of Europe.  The Prussian military 
suffered two defeats at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt.  Clausewitz was present at Auerstadt 
and captured by the French at Prenzlau when his unit surrendered which only served to reinforce 
in him the need for Prussian military reform.  Until 1809 he would remain Prince August’s Aid 
at which time Scharnhorst brought Clausewitz on to his staff.  After their crushing defeat at the 
hands of the French, King Friedrich Wilhelm III appointed Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr von 
Stein (1757-1831), a Prussian minister, to revamp the Prussian state.  Additionally, the king 
appointed Clausewitz’s old mentor Scharnhorst as president of his military reorganization 
commission.  Clausewitz served on this commission eventually running Scharnhorst’s office 
until 1810.9  Clausewitz was then reassigned to be the tutor for Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm 
IV and a professor at the Allgemeine Military Academy.  Following this France and Russia 
would go to war and Clausewitz would not stand idle by while Prussia allowed itself to be 
occupied by France.  He resigned from Prussian service and commissioned into the Russian 
Army from 1812 until in 1814 he was reaccepted back into Prussian service.  Clausewitz went 
back to his native country’s service when it assembled an army and, having formed an alliance 
with Austria and Russia, counter attacked back into France.  By 1815 Carl von Clausewitz was 
promoted to Major-General and served as Chief-of-Staff for troops stationed at Koblenz.  He was 
                                                 
9Strachen, Clausewitz’s On War, 48. 
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reassigned in 1818 to the Allegmeine Military Academy again but only in an administrative 
capacity.  Clausewitz’s final post with a line unit was in 1830 when he went to serve as Chief of 
Staff for a force deployed to the Polish border before returning home in 1831 shortly before 
passing away.   
During his service Clausewitz would not be assigned to any command capacity following 
the Rhine Campaigns against France.  It was however, during his early experiences campaigning 
in France following the Rhine Campaigns that led him to the development of the importance of 
political goals for military action.  The Rhine Campaigns ended after six months of the Prussian 
army wandering aimless and vulnerable in French territory following the fall of Mainz.  
Clausewitz watched as the army lost moral and a sense of direction, what started as an exciting 
and unimpeded invasion of France ended as a bedraggled and disenchanted army fearful of 
French reprisal withdrew to the east bank of the Rhine.  Even though after this he would not 
receive a battlefield command does not say that he was unable to serve with distinction.  
Clausewitz came to be known as an excellent staff officer which resulted in his numerous 
administrative appointments.  His experiences in the field as a staff officer not only exposed him 
to danger but also placed him in a position to deal with the larger scale supply, command, and 
administrative issues armies on campaign face regularly.   
Clausewitz’s long term experience with the folly of an old and traditionally stiff Prussian 
practices drove him to aid Scharnhorst with the reform of the Prussian military.  The reforms that 
Scharnhorst and he desired to implement needed coinciding civil reform.  Help came in the form 
of Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Stein assigned to constitutional reform and a friend of 
Clausewitz.  Military reform would not happen until the French occupation of Prussia following 
1806 and the new political reforms Stein began to implement in Prussia.  “A change to open 
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order battle tactics meant nothing less than a modification of the whole Prussian social 
system…”10  The theory Clausewitz wrote of came about as a result of his experience both on 
the field of war and politics. 
                                                
Following the Peace of Basle Carl von Clausewitz was forced to further his education.  
Because there were at that time no more battles by which he could prove his ability a better 
education would be the best chance for him to receive any sort of advancement.11  Following the 
treaty Clausewitz sought additional education on his own at first in the town of Neu-Rupin where 
his regiment was stationed for peacetime garrison.  Here, amidst constant drilling, he would 
endeavored to educate himself as best he could and had also enrolled in a local school to 
improved upon his command of mathematics, history, and French.  The education Clausewitz 
managed to get from his self motivated studies and what was offered at the school was lacking.  
To remedy his situation he enrolled in the Institution for the Young Officers in Berlin.  Though 
he managed to meet the minimum standards on the entry exam Clausewitz would not have been 
able to attend the school if not for the patronage of Gerhard von Scharnhorst.12  Clausewitz’s 
reassignment to the Military Academy was when he took the time to look back on his 
experiences and begin work on his book On War.13 
 Scharnhorst was at the time of Clausewitz’s arrival assigned to be the superintendent of 
the artillery department of the military academe.  Here not only was Carl von Clausewitz 
introduced to a more formal military education in tactics and military history but was able to 
 
10Parkinson, Clausewitz , 38-39. 
11 Ibid., 29. 
12 Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) was a Hanoverian who transferred into the Prussian military and 
became a mentor and father figure to Carl von Clausewitz.  He created an exclusive military society which 
promoted critical discussions on military tactics and technology of which Prince August was a member.  
Scharnhorst would eventually be called to help update the Prussian War machine.  
13 Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 67. 
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attend philosophical lectures as well under Professor Kiesewtter at the College of Medicine 
whose lectures focused on the work of Immanuel Kant.  Additionally, while studying at the 
academy Clausewitz took up reading the political philosophies of Dupan, Voltaire, Montesquieu, 
and Machiavelli.14  He also read the works of the German poets Schiller, Goethe, Holderlin.  
With exception of Machiavelli, Clausewitz’s education was dominated by the works of noted 
Enlightenment authors.15 
IV 
To understand Clausewitz’s intellectual development it is important to not only 
understand his life and experiences but his times and the movement that is known as the 
Enlightenment as well.  The Enlightenment was a Eurocentric intellectual movement the 
definition of which is difficult to define with certainty but most often what can be related to a 
few core values that would shape European thought.  What can be said about the Enlightenment, 
with any certainty is that it was most concerned with the human condition as regulated by 
rationality.  It was a movement away from the constraints of tradition, religion, and superstition 
where science, and not blind faith, was increasingly used to explain the world and its processes.  
This development of thought challenged not only the relation between people and the church but 
all social orders and affected all social and political strata of the eighteenth century.16  This 
resulted in the foundation of the United States on a constitution and rule by the people as well as 
                                                 
14 In both Roger Parkinson’s Clausewitz: A Biography and Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State, Niccolo 
Machiavelli (1469-1527) is attributed to having had the greatest impact on Clausewitz’s theories relating military 
ventures to political goals.  Machiavelli is known for is works The Prince and The Art of War.  In his writings, 
though not of the Enlightenment movement, advocated for logical and decisive decisions on the part of national 
leaders at the expense of all.  He wrote that the key to being a successful leader being the maintenance of power 
both from internal and external forces.  Clausewitz shared with Machiavelli only the aspects of the interplays of 
human nature, politics, and war and not the latter’s views on war having timeless principles or the scholarship of 
ancient warfare. See Smith, On Clausewitz, 60. 
15 For biographical information see Hew Strachan, Peter Paret, and Roger Parkinson. 
16 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 13. 
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the French Revolution.  However, its effects can also be seen in what became known as 
Enlightened Absolutism.  In the case of Eastern Europe; Prussia, Austria, and Russia this 
developed in the monarch a sense of the need to modernize and assimilate new technologies even 
to allow greater freedoms in their social systems.  These changes were made as a matter of 
pragmatism, in the hope that a modern state with citizens who enjoyed some amount of freedom 
would in the end prove to be a stronger more prosperous nations thereby ensuring their positions 
as benevolent monarchs.  A profound change in Prussia especially is the adoption of accepting 
non-nobility or those who had questionable claims to nobility into the officer corps and in higher 
government on the basis of ability and talent rather than purely by birth.17  This was an early 
modification, and what truly allowed first Clausewitz’s father then himself to become officers.  It 
had become obvious that there was a need for more talent within the Prussian bureaucracy and 
military and as a result restrictions had become increasingly lax until the reforms that were 
instituted after 1806. 
V 
Written between campaigns in the later years of his life, Clausewitz would die of cholera 
on the Polish border, in conjunction with the reforms sweeping both the Prussian military and 
state.  It was a consolidation, or would have been had he lived to see it to completion, of the 
lessons Clausewitz had learned from a life time of war as reflected in the Enlightenment values 
that he had grew up with.  “On War seeks to reconcile the theoretical rigor demanded by the 
Enlightenment with the intractability of war claimed by the Counter-Enlightenment.”18 Or, 
rather, Clausewitz was not only satisfied with pure theory but in exploring the limits of that 
theory with regard to the reality of the world in which all activity truly takes place.  On War was 
                                                 
17Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 15. 
18 Smith, On Clausewitz, 68. 
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published in 1832 so it is important to remember that his work was published after his death.  
The result of this is that it is unrefined, at times choppy or repetitive and in other areas 
contradicts its self.   
This section introduces and explores the fundamental concepts of Clausewitz’s theory of 
war.  The insight of On War is not just for the military minded it was written for “the Statesman 
and General” not two different people but what Clausewitz saw as a single person.19 
War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must 
measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features, is therefore 
policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that 
account cease to think according to its own laws.20 
 
War then is also defined by the many political and social aspects of a state which reside outside 
of the activity of combat.  Though it would seem an understatement in the present day Clausewitz 
put more emphasis on the importance of a political goal for war.  Jomini is noted as summing up 
the political influence on was as no more important than that the civilian leader should chose his 
most able commander to lead the war.21  It is in essence a societal function the terms of which are 
determined by the people who prosecute it.   As can be seen from the afore mentioned quote 
Clausewitz dealing with the dual nature of war which is to what he writes his work.  There is both 
the General’s desire to be victorious and defeat the enemy but also the Politician who has a 
political goal he seeks in the endeavor.  One must be submissive to the other and in the case of 
Clausewitz; he believed it to be the military aim directed by the political. 
Clausewitz felt that to write on war he needed to not only define the concept but elaborate 
on all of it’s aspects as they influence and relate to one another.  Without establishing this, his 
readers would have no starting point from which to reference his viewpoints.  Book I “On the 
                                                 
19 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin Group, 1982), 121. 
20 Ibid., 118. 




Nature of War” is a lengthy discussion that gives war a finite definition, examines a number of 
abstract military concepts, and acknowledges that war will have to faces from an academic 
standpoint.  In this first “book” he looks at the underlying currents of war, both in how it is 
waged and when it is waged.  All successive books in On War are based on how war and its 
nature are defined and relate back to book I. 
 War, the act itself, is defined by Clausewitz as essentially a contest of strength.  He opens 
with the view of it being little more than a duel on a grand scale.  The endpoint of war being that 
through force one side will overcome the other and be able to impress its desires or “will” on the 
other.  The victor then is the side that is able to dictate terms to the other.  Clausewitz continues 
to whittle down this concept until he arrives at the simple statement of “War therefore is an act of 
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil [sic] our will.”22  Here also at his definition of 
war Clausewitz emphasizes that the means of war is physical forces and the object of war the 
object being the submission of the opponent.   
 It is in the sections following his definition of war that introduces concepts where 
Clausewitz contradicts himself albeit with good reason.  When writing On War Clausewitz 
developed two different ways of considering war, and not from the aspect of fighting a war such 
as limited and total war.  In translation these two ideas are best described as war in the abstract, 
also termed absolute war, and war in the real world.  His development of these two ideas is 
simple.  The absolute to Clausewitz represents war in its perfect form, unrestricted by the 
realities of existence.   
Abstract war allows for what he calls the utmost use of force and exertion of powers, 
discussed later.  Real war is the conduct of war as constrained by various factors as simple as 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 101. 
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reality or constraining “human” elements.  The conflict between the abstract logical war and the 
reality of war is a recurring theme in the opening sections of On War.  This ends up being much 
of his discussion on theory as, theoretical concepts work wonderfully in an abstract world but 
that reality has too many variables in it to be place in a simplified system.  An absolute war is 
one where the involved parties have not context to one another social or political, there is no 
ambition or aggressiveness on either’s part and both lacking any concern for the past or present.  
It is what Hugh Smith calls “Pure War” which encapsulates the war as “a violent collision pure 
and simple” it is war without policy.23   
 
VI 
One issue that Carl von Clausewitz covers in the nature of war is the concept he calls 
reciprocal actions.  In his definition of war there are three of these reciprocal actions that escalate 
the hostilities between states at war with one another.  These reciprocal actions arise from 
different aspects of Clausewitz’s nature of war.  The first reciprocal action corresponds with the 
use of force, the second reciprocal action is dictated by the goal of war, and the third reciprocal 
action is the escalation of resources devoted to the war effort.  All three of these reciprocal 
actions imply from the aspect of the absolute war that the conflict will escalate continuously until 
one side achieves victory over the other. 
The first reciprocal action looks at the “utmost use of force” best described as the scale of 
force used in aggression.  Force in this case is the means by which either side seeks to make the 
other capitulate.  This is taking into account the methods of the military not resources committed 
to the conflict.  Here Clausewitz is referring to the actions taken rather than units or equipment 
                                                 
23 Smith, On Clausewitz, 112; 
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involved.  “We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its 
utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, 
which logically must lead to an extreme.”24  The greatest use of force would be the total 
destruction of an enemy’s ability to wage war such as attacking civilians, destroying 
infrastructure, or giving no quarter to surrendering soldiers.  There is no grantee that moral and 
ethical compunction will limit this at all.25  However there is some ground given by Clausewitz 
regarding moral limits to warfare, “…for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which 
proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst…” and in the same section “If the Wars of 
civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from 
the social condition of both States and in their relations to each other.”26  This first reciprocal 
action then is that one state will use some amount of force to impose it’s will on its opponent 
who will in return respond with a greater use of force ore suffer defeat. 
The second reciprocal action is in regard to the primary goal in war.  As the goal of a war 
is, as in wrestling, to impose one’s will on another the goal in war is to eliminate the others 
ability to resist.  War then can only end, again in the absolute sense, when one side has disarmed 
the other.  So long as this is the case war will continue until victory has been assured and there 
enemy no longer poses any threat of violence.  “As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may 
defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to 
him.”27  The second reciprocal action is based in fear of retaliation for actions previously taken 
during the course of the war. 
                                                 
24 von Clausewitz, On War, 103. 
25 Smith, On Clausewitz, 88. 
26 von Clausewitz, On War, 102. 
27 Ibid., 104. 
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The final reciprocal action is the fullest exertion of powers.  Powers here refers more to 
the resources such as people and materials that contribute to the war effort.  The third reciprocal 
action then is that as one side increases the resources it is devoting to the war effort it will gain 
and advantage which its opponent will seek to overcome.  There are two sources of power one 
being physical in the sense of resources available and the other in the drive of a nation to 
continue in its efforts.  “This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be 
separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will.”28  The concept 
developing form this reciprocal action will have varying interpretations in succeeding years.29   
The “Will” returns later in the discussion as an important aspect of success against an opponent.   
The need for reciprocal actions stems from Clausewitz’s logical approach. Clausewitz 
reasons his way through the theory by way of dialectic.  He forms the argument and defends it in 
as if in conversation to help show the line of though.  As he does so it becomes more apparent 
that there is a need for a system in which two political entities would continue on the path to 
war.30  This scientific approach of hypothesis, observations, analysis stems from the 
Enlightenment’s emphasis on a scientific methodology.  As in any other science Clausewitz was 
looking for an explanation for the currents moving states to war and then driving them forward to 
extremes. 
When looking at war Clausewitz has to contend with again reality and theory.  This is in 
many cases considered to be his greatest effort and contribution to military scholarship.  There 
are three factors that he attributes to causing variables in war forcing it out of the realm of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 This can be seen as either “total war” or attacking not only the enemy’s troops but the land itself in an 
effort to reduce their resource base or to destroy their will.  The other interpretation can be that of “totalitarian war” 
or all the aspects of the state; economic, industrial, political, to supply the war effort.  See Hew Strachan, 19-20. 
30 Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 84. 
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absolute.  He uses these three factors to show that the reality of war is not only both a play on 
chance and a logical endeavor that can be calculated but also possesses the addition of the 
random unpredictable nature of the peoples involved.  The factors are developed as the people, 
the military, and the government all of which contribute to every aspect of how when and why a 
war is fought.  Ultimately these things and the clash between them create the unpredictability of 
war.31  The contemplation of unpredictable factors of the human element was one of the things 
that set Clausewitz apart from his most well known contemporary Antoine-Henri Jomini.32  Of 
war Clausewitz writes: 
War is… a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, 
hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of 
probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the 
subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purly to the 
reason.33 
 
Each part of this trinity is interconnected to Clausewitz.  They represent the all elements of war 
that must be accounted for.  Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz felt that it was necessary to develop not 
necessarily a strategic theory for war but to look at the fundamental and unchanging aspects of 
war and develop an understanding of their relation to develop a flexible theory of war.34  Given a 
background in a reorganizing military having fought an entrenched dogma of military principles 
to achieve reform, Clausewitz chose to focus on a theory that would transcend the restriction 
technology and tactics. 
People, the participants who carry out the actions involved in the given situation, are a 
constant variable in any event war or otherwise.  Where previously military theorists had focused 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 179. 
32 Antoine-Henri Jomini was a French officer during the French Revolution and much of the succeeding 
Napoleonic Wars though in 1813 he left French service for Russia after incurring feelings of unjust treatment.  
Jomini was the most well known military author at the time as he wrote in French and focused on scientific 
breakdowns of strategy leaving out philosophical discussions making his work more accessible to military readers. 
33 von Clausewitz, On War, 106. 
34 Osgood, Military Stategy. 
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on the mathematical probabilities involved it was always done so while leaving out the human 
element.35  Until Clausewitz attempted to tackle the problems created by these immeasurable 
factors military theorists simply left them out of their equations and focused on the calculable 
elements of war.  These previous conclusions were falsified; Clausewitz’s contemporaries and 
forbearers on military writing had simply assumed unpredictable elements to be even between 
the involved parties.36  The incalculable did not fit well into the scientific methodology that was 
so desirable to the enlightened thinker. 
“People” stands for the population of nations as a whole and what Clausewitz was 
concerned about with them was their support of the effort of war.  He considers this aspect of 
war to be “blind instinct”.  The people are most prone to being swayed by emotions.  Therefore, 
their ferocity in combat, if they are soldiers, or their willingness to sacrifice for the war effort, in 
civilians, is dependant on culture.  This is considered the irrational portion of war.  It includes the 
sentiments and feelings involved in the conflict. 
The general and his army are given to the realm of probability.  The human aspect is 
taken from the army in this factor as the motivations of the people who make up the army are 
tied to the previous factor.  Clausewitz sees the military’s part in war is one of probabilities and 
calculations of strength both inherent strength of arms, technology, and numbers or by position 
on the field.  These are the things that the General is most concerned with at the moment of battle 
and make war for him a deadly game of chance.   
The government is the logical element in Clausewitz’s trinity of war.  Because he has 
defined war as being a tool of policy it is then the responsibility of the government body to set a 
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logical or military goal that will reasonably achieve its political goal.  For Clausewitz this is the 
only pure place of logic and reason as government bodies must ensure that the military goal and 
political goal are aligned or else the war loses all meaning. 
 With regard to disarming the enemy there is another trinity in Clausewitz’s thinking.  To 
disarm a nation he says there are three things to keep in mind with regard to the enemy; military 
power, the country, and the will.  To achieve victory then enemy has to be disarmed and 
therefore their military power must be eliminated and their country conquered so that another 
force cannot be raised.  Clausewitz adds that these two things can occur but in the end so long as 
the enemy possesses the will to fight the previous achievements mean nothing.  He writes that to 
break the will of the enemy what must happen for there to be a victor is that one of the opponents 
must find that the odds are no in their favor and that it is not worth while to continue the conflict. 
 So then as the primary goal in a war is to disarm the enemy the best way to achieve this is 
to convince the enemy that war is not a feasible to continue, or even start.  “As War is no act of 
blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object 
determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased.”37  Simply put when a 
war is conducted it is done so at the consideration what is expected to be gained from the conflict 
as well as what is accepted as a reasonable cost to buy that gain.  This is a concept that was 
driven home during his first campaign, while yet a boy he recognized that his unit’s aimless 
wandering in the French country side was a pointless endever that was in all a wasteful risk as 
there was no guiding objective for the regiment.38  On the other hand this also represents the 
amount of force a state would be willing to apply to the enemy.  It is not only advocating for 
frugal use of resources but of moderating what actions are acceptable in an army’s conduct of 
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war.  Victory then comes when one side can convince the other that this is no longer a point to 
continue hostilities.  Rather, when one the will of one side can be overcome.  Outside of this the 
threat of continued conflict still looms.   
                                                
 Carl von Clausewitz’s theory relies upon what he outlines as the nature of war as 
previously described.  On the whole then the key factors to his theory are that: First, war is an 
instrument of policy, second, as war is a tool of policy the political object will determine then 
forces and resources necessary to achieve success, and third, states arrive at war and continue 
conflict based on reciprocal actions which will ever push each other to an extreme.  Essentially 
all other aspects of On War return to these three principles in some manner.   
 Final extraneous elements to Clausewitz’s theory that do not necessarily return to one of 
the parts of the nature of war are the genius for war and the value of studying history.  Both of 
these points appear in his book and demonstrate values of the Enlightenment but do not 
specifically return to his binding of military and political ideas in his theory so much as the 
combination of rationality and realism.  Genius is focused on the part of the general who 
commands the army, but can also be likened to commander in chief of the military.  History is 
important of the grounding in reality it brings to the theory of war, in this case his theory.  Study 
of the past is important for the statesman and general for it helps them to recognize the instability 
of theories that ignore the context of society. 
We know very well that this word is used in many significations which are very 
different both in extent and nature, and that with many of these significations it is 
a very difficult task to define the essence of Genius; but as we neither profess to 
be philosopher nor grammarian, we must be allowed to keep to the meaning usual 
in ordinary language, and to understand by ‘genius’ a very high mental capacity 
for certain employments. 39 
 
 
39 Ibid., 138. 
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 As can be seen from the selection, genius simply denotes someone with an outstanding 
mental aptitude for military applications.  This is in converse to Jomini who rather than 
emphasizing flexibility and genius instead focuses on concepts of geometrical military theory.40  
This concept of genius, or aptitude, is all encompassing in On War and is not simply limited to a 
commander’s capacity for the tactical and strategic with regard to the conduct of one in war.  It 
carries over into the individuals fighting as well.  In this section the additional ramifications of 
genius are that of courage and individual imitative, or the will to act of one’s own accord in the 
conduct of a battle.  This has multiple applications as one of the reforms that Clausewitz, along 
with Scharnhorst pushed for in the Prussian military was that of increasing the use of skirmishers 
in the infantry.41   
Though that is not to say that genius has no place in the mind of the leadership involved 
where “Good generalship requires effective responses to rapidly changing political, strategic and 
tactical circumstances.  Assessing all these factors is a ‘colossal task,’ and beyond the powers of 
the normal person.”42  On the part of the leadership in combat there are a multitude of stressful 
factors that demand their attention.  To this Clausewitz writes “resolution is indebted to a special 
direction of the mind for its existence, a direction which belongs to a strong head rather than to a 
brilliant one.”43  He is referring here to the stresses of battle, that while under the pressure of 
combat it is not simply enough to be intelligent, even to the point of being termed brilliant.  
Rather, it is of greatest importance that one retains their mental capacity to continue to forward 
toward the objective.  The scope of this can be limited to another trio, where first the leader can 
apply the rules, of war, to a military situation, second they can maintain the presence of mind in 
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combat to make a decision and finally have internalized a logical process by which to analyze 
the data quickly.44  He was writing of a talented individual.  He did not in any way reference 
class or nobility.  As was reflected in the currents of the Prussian Officer Corps, leadership and 
ranks, with exception of the royal line, was not a justifying reason for command.45 
 History took a special importance to Clausewitz.  They were a means by which to study 
war and the influence of social and political factors in combat.  History, in effect, offered case 
studies for him to lend cultural contexts to battle.  Clausewitz notes that there are many things in 
military theory that can be calculated.  As has been discussed this is how many of his 
contemporaries and predecessors developed their concepts, purely on the basis of calculation and 
logic leaving out irritating irregularities.  As Clausewitz had already developed a sense that 
variable elements must also be included in theory the best way to acknowledge these was to 
examine their effects in engagements.  
That iron ball to which powder has given a velocity of 1,000 feet in a second, 
smashes every living thing which it toughes in its course is intelligible in itself; 
experience is not required to tell us that the Physical is not the only effect which 
we have to sudy, it is the moral which we are in search of, and that con only be 
ascertained by experience; and there is no other way of learning and appreciating it 
but by experience.46 
 
While Clausewitz endorses the use of history to fine the moral truths of war, he also cautions 
about verifying the historical truth in the account.  Because he noted that the viability of the 
history studied would decrease the further into the historical record a source came from, he 
studied much more the wars of the seventeenth century where many of his contemporaries 
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focused on classical studies.47  Clausewitz was even critical of Machiavelli whose political ideas 
he admired very much.  His criticism of the Renaissance writer’s military strategy was the same 
that he found fault with in his peers, that of being entirely too focused on classical military 
literature.48  Clausewitz did not believe there was an undeniable truth to war and that the battles 
of antiquity were too dated to help on the modern battlefield. 
VII 
 The study of Clausewitz tends toward the development of him and his work as a product 
of the Enlightenment.  The secondary sources gathered for this examination of Clausewitz tend 
toward either biographical sources or political analysis of his work.  As expected in the 
monographs their authors develop extensive biographical detail regarding Clausewitz to form a 
base by which they can examine his work.  Outside the general consensus of all these sources of 
Clausewitz’s background they also seem to defend him as being simply misunderstood and 
treated unfairly.  Though no disparaging text was found for this examination this is likely to one 
of the key reasons why On War itself was slow to produce a following.   
 Carl von Clausewitz’s work was largely inaccessible to the rest of the world.  Because of 
its posthumous publishing On War was, and continues to be, difficult to read.  It did not gather 
many readers even in Germany for some time after its publishing.  It was considered too difficult 
to read and as it tended towards a philosophical discussion of war.  This was in a time when the 
preferred understanding of military theory was scientific it was slow to attract the attention of its 
assumed military audience, especially when other contemporary works were more in line with 
the standard scientific approach and had been published in more than just German.  Clausewitz’s 
on War: A Biography takes the most interest in On War’s various translations and development.  
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The first English translation was not published until 1873 and the book itself became popular in 
France before it ever did in the nations of its mother tongue. 
 Carl von Clausewitz’s On War continues to appear on the reading lists of war colleges all 
over the world.  He arrived at a concept for military strategy that tried to overcome the dogma of 
his age in the use of a scientific theory that he believed to be to rigid to appropriately explain war 
and its relationship to the state.  Through personal experience in a lifetime of war and study 
Clausewitz arrived at a conclusion that the military arm of a state needed to be given a political 
aim if utilized.  Without this kind direction, as He witnessed as a young lieutenant, an army is 
likely to wander aimlessly and at its own peril.  In effect is becomes a waste of resources and 
runs the risk of destruction with no benefit to the nation.  He relates the practical and theoretical 
and advocates for the study of war to demonstrate the incalculable in war.   
In the context of the Enlightenment in Germany the military reform the Clausewitz 
advocated for and that are reflected in On War shows a trend in changing though regarding 
warfare in Prussia.  Clausewitz’s ideas were arrived at through a combination of his personal 
education and experiences fighting in the Napoleonic Wars.  Through his influences both martial 
and domestic Clausewitz drafted a military theory that reflected the need for flexibility and 
change that could bee seen not just in the Prussian state.  As he had to break from the scientific 
method, held in the highest esteem during the Enlightenment, it can be said of Clausewitz that he 
wrote to the Counter-Enlightenment.  However, his meticulous breakdown of war into its 
fundamental parts and the sharp examination of those parts is a result of his Enlightenment 
background. 
Of Prussia and its culture much can be learned from studying On War.  When writing this 
book Clausewitz was part of a movement to reform the Prussian army to be more effective.  As 
 
25 
stated above, this could not happen without also a change in the social system of Prussia, it 
would have been impractical, as well as dangerous for the monarchy, to reform the military 
without seeing first to its own domestic structures.  This also shows how very close the civilian 
state and the military machine were interwoven in Prussia. 
On War itself falls in an ambiguous place in academics.  It is in essence military theory; 
however strategy and tactics are of less concern than the fundamental nature of war and its 
reflection on society.  It had been read by statesmen, academics, and military professionals.  All 
have found some lesson to take away from it, either in appropriately directing military operations 
or simply learning new insights into a militarized society.  On War is more than purely military 
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